The New York Times investigation into possible links between Iran's water projects and the military work of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) has drawn heavy criticism. Most of it has focused on the dams. The tunnels, which were just as central to the story, have been largely forgotten.
In the past few days, two videos have brought them back into view. One, a timelapse posted on social media, appears to show crews digging a series of tunnels. The other shows IRGC commander General Vahidi walking through an underground missile city. Neither tells us who dug these tunnels or with what equipment. But together they show that the Guards' tunneling capacity is large, active, and still growing in the middle of a war. Where that machinery and expertise came from, and whether public infrastructure budgets helped pay for it, is no longer an abstract question. It is being filmed.
The reporters offered a hypothesis based on what they found, and some of the criticism is fair. Being close on a map does not prove a connection. Speculation should be labeled as speculation, and the reporters did label it. Some critics went further and claimed the story was written to justify attacks on dams. Civilian infrastructure should never be a military target. But the reporters were looking at strikes that had already happened and the patterns those strikes revealed. They were not proposing new targets.
Much of the criticism, though, has drifted away from the real question. Instead of looking at the evidence, critics have attacked an exaggerated version of the story, focused on what publishing it might lead to, or raised points that tell us nothing about whether the reported links exist. The real question is simple: did any civilian infrastructure projects, contractors, machines, or engineering skills help build underground military sites? Answering it takes evidence about contracts, purchases, construction records, and who works with whom.
Fighting a Claim Nobody Made
One common move is the straw man: inflating a claim so it is easy to knock down. An inquiry into links between water-transfer projects, tunneling firms, and military construction gets retold as "the Times says Iran built its dams to hide missiles." Rejecting that cartoon version answers nothing.
A contractor can work on both civilian and military projects. A tunnel boring machine bought for a water tunnel can be moved to another site. Skills learned digging a metro line can be used to dig under a mountain. Take Sepasad. It is part of Khatam al-Anbiya, the IRGC's construction arm, and is under UN, US, and UK sanctions for that reason. It builds dams and tunnels, and it was a main contractor on Tehran's Metro Line 7, where a tunnel boring machine was brought in through an Italian subcontractor. Over the years, it has built up serious underground digging experience. It is not an ordinary civilian company. It sits inside the Guards' engineering network. Given ties like these, the fact that a project served a civilian purpose does not rule out a military one.
"It Was Corruption, Not the Military"
Another argument says Iran's dam-building frenzy came from bad governance, farm expansion, political rivalry, and contractors chasing money. That is well documented. Iran's damaging water policies do not need a secret military motive to explain them. But why a dam was built is a different question from where its machines and engineers went afterward. The same industry can serve several masters at once. Tunnel boring machines, geotechnical know-how, and underground construction work just as well for an underground missile base as for a water tunnel.
Proving military use would take field work, access to contracts and technical files, and interviews with engineers and contractors. How is anyone supposed to do that when the Iranian government blocks information about how public money is spent? Environmental researchers who held official permits have been harassed, jailed, and accused of spying. Demanding hard proof while blocking every way to get it sets an impossible bar. That secrecy does not prove military use, but it makes independent scrutiny more necessary, not less.
Worrying About Consequences Instead of Checking Facts
The most misleading criticism is that the reporting could help justify bombing Iran's dams. This ignores a basic fact. The investigation was built partly on strikes that had already happened. Reporters looked at where military sites had been hit and what water infrastructure sat nearby. The article came after those strikes, not before. The United States and Israel had already picked and hit those targets. An article published later cannot have caused or justified them. The reporters were trying to understand what the strike map might reveal, not suggesting new targets.
That does not make the danger go away. President Trump has openly threatened Iran's power plants, bridges, and other infrastructure. Given those threats and the strikes so far, more attacks on sites described as "dual use" are a real worry. They could cause a humanitarian and environmental disaster, and calling something dual use does not make it a lawful target. Still, the risk of future attacks says nothing about whether the reporting is accurate. A story can be correct even if others later misuse it. And if it has flaws, they have to be shown with evidence, not with guesses about what might happen next.
Journalists are responsible for checking their facts and being clear about what they don't know. The Times reporters said openly that the links they examined are unproven. Military commanders are responsible for their own targeting choices and for obeying the laws of war. That responsibility cannot be shifted onto reporters writing about strikes that already happened.
Changing the Subject
Some critics use a red herring: they bring in issues that sound related but don't touch the core question. Pointing out that the United States, Europe, and other countries have also mismanaged water may help explain a global pattern of bad dam-building. It tells us nothing about whether Iranian contractors or tunneling machines ended up on military sites. Other countries' failures neither prove nor disprove anything about the IRGC.
The same thing happens with the jailed environmentalists. Asking whether they drew suspicion because they worked near sensitive military sites is not the same as agreeing with the spying charges. Explaining why someone was arrested is not saying the arrest was right. In both cases, the original question quietly gets swapped for a different one.
Mistaking "Unproven" for "False"
Secret military work is hard to investigate. Contracts, classified files, and operational records are out of reach. That calls for caution, but it doesn't make investigation impossible. Satellite images, construction patterns, physical evidence, and corporate ties can reveal what official records hide. One clue may mean little. Several independent clues pointing the same way start to form a pattern. A pattern is not proof, but it is a reason to keep looking.
A serious critique should say which claims are weak, which leaps are shaky, and which other explanations fit the facts better. Saying a claim is unproven is fair. Saying it is false because the proof is locked away goes further than the evidence allows. The same rule applies to the reporters. Being technically possible, being nearby, or sharing a corporate parent does not show that a project served the military. But when these line up, they make a reasonable hypothesis worth testing. Missing proof does not mean nothing happened, and a pile of circumstantial evidence does not mean it did.
How the Debate Gets Reframed
Straw men make the claim easier to dismiss. Red herrings make it easier to forget. Taken together, these arguments pull attention away from the questions that matter. Media researchers call this agenda-setting (what people talk about) and framing (how it gets presented). Both can shape what the public thinks without changing a single fact. Once a story about contractors and the military is recast as a plot to justify bombing dams, the debate shifts from evidence and accountability to the motives of journalists. Meanwhile, the real questions go unanswered.
Who got the contracts? Who owned and ran the tunnel boring machines? Where were they used? How were civilian engineering firms tied to IRGC contractors? Was public money, or the skills and equipment it paid for, later used for military building? These are questions about public money, accountability, and whether civilian resources were diverted to the military. They matter whether or not there is a war.
It is fair to scrutinize journalists and their sources. But questioning their motives doesn't show their findings are wrong. And the fact that several critics make the same argument doesn't, by itself, prove a coordinated disinformation campaign. That would need its own evidence. The test for any criticism is whether it helps us learn what happened or just changes what we are arguing about. When the fight over the story becomes bigger than the evidence, the people and institutions that should be investigated walk away unexamined.